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recovery from an employee of payment to which, through
subsequent events, he is no longer entitled." To alleviate
the situation in Maryland it is suggested that the present
Section 17 of Article 95A be amended. The following
provision is, therefore, submitted to broaden Section
17(d) :
Any person who, because of the subsequent receipt of
income deductible from benefits which is allocable to
the time for which benefits were paid, becomes not
entitled to such benefits under this act, shall be liable
to repay such amount to the Executive Director for
the Unemployment Insurance Fund.
WILBERT

H.

SIROTA

Extension Of Absolute Privilege To Executive
Officers Of Government Agencies
Barrv. Matteol
Plaintiffs, employees of the Office of Rent Stabilization,
had sponsored a terminal leave plan in 1950 which became
the subject of congressional criticism in 1953. The defendant, acting director of the agency, had disapproved of
the plan. Without defendant's knowledge, a letter promulgating the plan was drafted by one of the plaintiffs and set
out over the defendant's name, which his secretary signed.
The letter provoked criticism from the Senate which was
reported in the press.2 As the acting director, the defendant
received inquiries as to the agency's position on the matter.
Consequently he issued a press release declaring his intention to suspend the plaintiffs and expressing the opinion
that the plan was against government policy.' Plaintiffs
brought an action for libel, charging that the press release
coupled with the contemporaneous news reports disclosing
senatorial criticism of the plan defamed them and that
the publication had been actuated by malice. The District
Court overruled the defendant's plea that he was protected by either a qualified or absolute privilege. The
Court of Appeals, in affirming the judgment of the District
0BURNS' INDIANA STATUTES (Supp. 1959) § 53-1537(b).
1

360 U.S. 564 (1959).
9 See 99 Gong. Rec. (1953) 868-8T-1.
3 For text of the news release see. 'Barr v. Matteo, 8upra, n. 1, 567-568,
fn. 5.

1960]

BARR v. MATTEO

Court, held that the defendant was not entitled to an absolute privilege because his explanation to the press "went
entirely outside his line of duty."4 The defendant had
failed to include the defense of qualified privilege in his
brief to the Court of Appeals, but on reconsideration urged
the court to consider it. The court, however, treated the
defense as having been waived by defendant's failure to
raise it properly in his brief as required by the court's
rules. On petition for certiorari on the denial of the defense of absolute privilege, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari but, acting under its supervisory powers, remanded the case to the Court of Appeals with a direction to
pass on the claim of qualified privilege. The reasoning
of the Supreme Court was that it should not rule unnecessarily on the defense of absolute privilege, involving the
conflict of private right and public duty, when the record
revealed that the Court of Appeals might have disposed, of
the case on the narrower ground of qualified privilege.5 On
remand, the Court of Appeals held that there was a qualified
privilege. Since there was evidence, however, from which a
jury might conclude that the defendant (1) was motivated
by malice or (2) lacked reasonable grounds for believing
his statement, either of which would have defeated a defense of qualified privilege, the case was remanded to the
District Court for retrial.'
Defendant again sought and was granted certiorari to
determine whether his defense of absolute privilege should7
have barred, the suit despite the allegations of malice.
The Supreme Court held that under the circumstances of
this case the defendant, being the head of an administrative
agency, was absolutely privileged in issuing the press
release.' Mr. Justice Harlan, writing for the majority,
reasoned that the absence of absolute privilege might deter
minor executive officials from the "unflinching discharge of
their duties," and that the publicity and criticism surrounding the policy advocated by the plaintiffs entitled the
',Barr v. Matteo, 244 F. 2d 767, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
8355 U.S. 171 (1957). For a discussion of this point see Comment, Per
Curiam Decisions o1 the Supreme Court: 1957 Term, 26 U. Chi. L. Rev.
279, 307 (1959); and Recent Case, Supreme Court Will Grant Certiorari
To Remand Ca8e For Determination Of An Issue Not Properly Raised
In The Court Of Appeals, 106 U. 'Pa. L. Rev. 1066 (1958).
*Barr v. Matteo, 256 F. 2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
'858 U.S. 917 (1958).
a360 U.S. 564 (1959).
Ibid., 571. See Judge Learned Hand's opinion in Gregoire v. Biddle,
177 F. 2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. den. 339 U.S. 949 (1950), which is
quoted at length in Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion.
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defendant to make a public statement of his position as
head of the agency.
Absolute privilege affords complete protection to a public official without regard to his motive or the reasonableness of his conduct, so long as the publication of the defamatory matter is in the course of -his duties. On the
other hand, a qualified privilege is conditioned upon publication in a reasonable manner and for a proper purpose.
It may be defeated by a showing of 'either the presence of
malice or a lack of reasonable grounds for believing the
statement." The malice required to defeat a qualified
privilege, however, must be that which is induced by
improper motives and not merely such constructive malice
as can be inferred from the simple fact of publication.."
The history of absolute privilege for the executive
branch is comparatively short 2 when juxtaposed with its
legislative" and judicial 4 antecedents. The absolute
privilege granted an executive officer is based on public
policy - that placing a government official's conduct
before a jury would unduly hamper his performance of
duties and would, therefore, be against the public interest. 5
The executive branch is numerically much larger than the
other two branches of government, and the authority of
its functionaries to frame policies and to hire and fire
personnel is widely varied. As a result, it is more difficult
to establish definite standards under which an executive
employee knows when a statement made in the "line of
duty" is absolutely privileged than it is to establish such
clear standards for legislative and judicial officers.'"
The Court weighed two interests in the principal case:
(1) The protection of the individual citizen against pe10See generally, PROSSER, TORTS (2d ed. 1955) 60-629 and cases cited
therein.
u See HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS (1956) § 5.27; and RESTATEMENT, TORTS
(1934) §§ 599-605.
12Sutt6n v. Johnson, 1 T.R. 493 (1786) appears to be the earliest case
recognizing the executive privilege. See Mr. Chief Justice Warren's dissenting opinion, Barr v. M'atteo, 360 U.S. 564, 580 (1959).
18See 'Veeder, Absolute Immunity In Defamation: Legislative And
E.Tecutive Proceedings, 10 Col. L. Rev. 131 (1910). The privilege is given
'to Congress by the United States Constitution, Art. I. § 6. The constitutions
of almost all of the states extend the privilege to the state legislatures.
See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 375 (1951). This privilege,
however, has not been extended to inferior deliberative bodies. See 'Barr
v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 579, Warren, C.J., dis. op., 579, n. 4.
4See Veeder, Absolute Immunity In Defamation: Judicial Proceedings,
9 Col. L. Rev. 463 (1909). Development of the privilege is traced in
Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335. (U.S. 1871).
15See Chatterton v. Secretary of State for India, 2 Q.'B. 189 (1895).
10Cf. Mr. Chief Justice Warren's dissenting opinion, 'Barr v. Matteo, 360
U.S. 564, 585-586 (1959).
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crniary damage caused by oppressive or malicious action
by a federal official; and (2) The public interest in shieldL
ing responsible government officers against vindictive or
ill-founded damage suits. A third interest, not expressly
set forth by the Court but implicit in the opinion, is that
of public disclosure of matters of vital public interest.
The latter interest, as the basis for granting absolute privilege to a cabinet officer, was propounded by the Court of
7
Appeals for the District of Columbia in,Mellon v. Brewer."
The plaintiff in that case had been conducting an investigation of the Treasury Department for three years and
had submitted unfavorable reports to the President and
the Attorney General which were the basis for a Congressional investigation of the Department. The defendant,
Secretary of the Treasury, issued a press release which
revealed a report made by him to the President that impugned the good faith of the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals stressed that the subject of the report was of vital
concern to the public and that the failure of the defendant
to make such a report might have
shaken public confidence
8
in the Treasury Department.
The leading case on the question of absolute privilege
is Spalding v. Vilas,19 in which the Postmaster General was
held absolutely privileged to issue circulars which called
attention to legislation that worked injury to an attorney
employed by claimants to present their claims against the
Post Office. The circular informed the claimants that the
legislation gave them the opportunity to evade payment
of fees which they had agreed to allow the attorney. The
rationale employed by the Court was that the effective
operation of the executive branch would be hampered
if the motives that control a cabinet officer's official conduct could be subject to a civil suit for damages.2"
Following the concept of the Spalding case, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia held in Glass v. Ickes2
that the Secretary of the Interior acted within the scope of
his duties and was entitled to the protection, of an absolute
privilege in issuing a press release warning all operators
that the plaintiff had been barred from practice before
agencies of that Department. The questions of excessive
publication and the appropriateness of using the press
118 F. 2d 168 (D.C. Cir. 1927), cert. den. 275 U.S. 530 (1927).

19See Comment, Defamation Immunity For Executive Offleers, 20 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 677, 691 (1953).
"161 U.S. 483 (1896).
Ibid., 498-499.
'117 F. 2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert. den. 311 U.S. 718 (1941).
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release as the instrumentality of communication for relAying facts which were important to persons dealing with
the Department of the Interior were disregarded by the
Court of Appeals, except for the oblique observation that
there might be circumstances under which an official would
exceed his prerogative in issuing a particular communication to the press. The questions of the necessity for the
publication and the press release as a proper instrumentality of communication had been considered in the
Mellon 22 rationale in determining whether the press release was in the line of duty, and thus must be answered
if this rationale is to be submitted as the basis for an absolute privilege. In the Glass case the failure to answer
these two questions did not escape Chief Judge Groner,
who in a concurring opinion expressed the fear that the
privilege may have been extended beyond the reasons for
its creation.2" One year later the same Court of Appeals
refused an absolute privilege to a United States Marshal
who made a public explanation of the discharge of deputies
on the ground that the defendant had, no duty to inform
the public about the matter.2 4
In the instant case Mr. Justice Harlan adopted both the
rationale of the Spalding2 5 case and that of the Mellon"
case. After quoting from the former he concluded that in
the final balance it would be better to deny relief to a
defamed plaintiff than to subject government officials who
do their duty to the threat of law suits which would
consume time and energies which could otherwise be devoted to government service. And, although he did not
quote from the Mellon case, he stated that the circumstances of the wide publicity and the correspondence sent
out over the defendant's signature, which could have been
read as advocating a position opposite to that which he had
actually taken, made appropriate a public statement by
him as the agency head.
In a companion case, Howard v. Lyons,27 the Court,
applying the same rationale as in the principal case, held
that a commanding officer of a naval shipyard in Massachusetts was absolutely privileged to send members of
that state's delegation in Congress letters explaining his
reasons for withdrawing recognition of a labor organiza3Supra, circa n. 17.
117 F. 2d 273, 281 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
" Colpoys v. Gates, 118 F. 2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
2 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
M18 F. 2d 168 (D.C. Cir. 1927).
M360 U.S. 593 (1959).
2
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tion as the bargaining representative of organized employees in the shipyard."8 Mr. Justice Stewart joined the
majority in this case, whereas in the principal case he dissented on the ground that the press release was not a
proper exercise of discretion in announcing public policy.2"
In the Barr case the Chief Justice, with whom Mr.
Justice Douglas joined in dissent, found the interest of
the individual to be paramount and also observed that the
majority opinion established no standard to guide executive conduct." Mr. Justice Brennan, in a separate dissent,
objected on the grounds that the majority dealt with concepts of public policy and purported to balance interests
could be more efficaciously determined
of society which
8
by Congress.
Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion appears to be a logical
extension and application of the rationales which traditionally have influenced the Court in this area. The case
ostensibly extends absolute privilege to any executive
official whose duties include the discretionary authority to
issue a press release. Since the power to issue press releases is seldom expressly authorized by Congress, as
pointed out by the Chief Justice,8 2 the Court must determine the perimeter of an official's line of duty and whether
this perimeter encompasses the discretionary authority to
issue a press release. As this area of the law evolves on a
case by case basis, the critical question which will probably
tip the balance between the interest of the individaul and
the interest of the government may be whether the subject matter is of sufficient public interest to justify the
press release by the government official.
JoN F. OsTER
2 The Court also rejected an attempt to hold the defendant liable under
the libel law of Massachusetts and held that the absolute privilege must
be judged by federal standards. Ibid., 597.
360 U.S. 564, 592 (1959).
oIbid., 578.
B' Ibid., 586.
SIbid., 578.

